ASIS International Thinks Twice About Pretexting, I Think
Several weeks ago I took ASIS International and Jack Lichtenstein (Director, Government Affairs and Public Policy) to task regarding the society’s decision to define pretexting as “the use of false, fraudulent, or fictitious information in order to gather personal information during investigations (emphasis added).” I pointed out that using a plausible but false assertion to conceal one’s true purpose or intent has been an acceptable method of investigation for investigators for years. In fact, most covert investigations use pretexts at some level and I cited a number of examples. Professional investigators will agree that whether an organization uses private sector investigators or its own employees to conduct its investigations, pretexts are often necessary in order to gain the confidence of those being investigated and conceal the investigator’s true purpose. As any rational person would surely admit, covert investigations can only be successful if the investigator conducting the investigation does not reveal his real identity or intent. ASIS now seems to agree, or so it appears.
In the June 17, 2008, issue of Security Management Daily, ASIS ran a piece entitled “Counter Attack”: Companies Should Take Steps to Stop Counterfeiting. The piece was an excerpt from a June 5, 2008, item posted on CFO.com entitled Counter Attack by Jack Myers, a contributing editor. According to Myers, 7% of all goods sold globally are likely counterfeit. The damage to U.S. businesses is staggering. Myers claims that counterfeit goods cost American businesses about $600 billion in lost revenue and the elimination of nearly 750,000 jobs. China of course, is widely acknowledged to be ground zero for the production of most counterfeit products, accounting for 80 percent of all the items confiscated last year by U.S. Customs. Myers explains that victim companies employ investigators to seek out and indentify counterfeiters. He says that “getting the evidence to pursue a case all the way to the ultimate kingpin can be very difficult” and often the only investigative tool available is undercover. As most security professionals know, undercover by its very nature is the ultimate investigative pretext. It and other pretexts are used by hundreds, if not thousands, of ASIS members every day in the course of their investigations. Yet until citing Myers, ASIS maintained “it [would] not invest its reputation in an effort to convince lawmakers to not outlaw pretexting”.
